Unprecedented success -- the tale of a Seattle Mariners' dynasty

[GM_CheatSheets]

It's been a while since I've posted around here. In all honesty, I was a little burnt out from playing OOTP and haven't played but for a few days from November until June.

I was having a lot of fun building a Montreal Expos expansion dynasty using my cheatsheets, but it was becoming a lot of effort to track and record. You can check out that thread if you are interested: http://www.ootpdevelopments.com/boar...d.php?t=272431

The amateur draft in early June gave me the OOTP itch again and I decided to start a simple game just for the fun of it. I also realized that I had been working on a new and improved, version 2.0 of my trademark spreadsheets just before I went on hiatus. This new game would also be my first chance at testing the new spreadsheet.

You can try the new spreadsheet too. Download at https://gmcheatsheets.wordpress.com/spreadsheets/. The updated user guide and description of changes is still forthcoming.

I started by simulating a few seasons before deciding to take over a struggling Seattle Mariners franchise. They were among the worst teams in MLB by record for a few years in a row and had a poorly ranked farm system as well. About the only positive was that there was an end in sight to their major contract commitments. And I would be in good position to pick some of the top talents in the amateur draft. I also thought it would be a good challenge to try to best the Mariners' regular season 116-46 record in 2001.

The game didn't start out looking too promising as I finished in last place in the division three of the first six years. In the best two of the six years, I finished one game below .500. But compared to the team's expected record in those seasons, it was mostly due to luck.

Things started to look up in 2027 with a surprise first place finish (92 wins) in the AL West. The farm system was starting to show some promise as well. The momentum carried into 2028 as the Mariners reached 96 wins, though it was only good enough for a wild card spot. These teams were built around a mix of rookies and veterans with exceptional defense. The pitching wasn't much to write about. The offense was mostly average in 2027, then showed a potential core starting to emerge in 2028.

I was starting to get excited as a long-term vision for this team came together. I just never expected what would happen next.

It took a little time, but this "just for fun" dynasty that I didn't want to meticulously document turned into something I felt like I have to share.

In the following posts I will recap the moves that made this first championship era of the dynasty possible. I will also set the scene for what I hope will be a smooth transition into continued success and a second championship era.

[Bub13]

Welcome back. I enjoyed your Montreal dynasty, but can definitely see how that became a lot of work to keep afloat.

[GM_CheatSheets]

None of these moves felt like franchise-altering moves at the time they were made. And it is only collectively that they really start to set a new direction for the franchise. What is undeniable, though, is that the Mariners finished the 2028 season with an exciting future on the horizon.

I also want to mention that these are all of the moves that worked out. There are plenty of other players I drafted, international amateurs I signed, players I traded for, and free agents I signed that did not pan out. I hope in future posts to do a more comprehensive review of the amateur draft and international signings.

My offense had two veteran anchors and an emerging young core.

I acquired catcher Philip Clarke in an off-season trade before the start of the 2022 season. He was the #85 ranked prospect when I acquired him and projected to be above average with both his bat and defense. He debuted in 2023 and averaged 3 WAR per year for the six years leading in to 2029. Without any catching prospects on the rise, my first move of the off-season was to lock Clarke into a three-year extension, with the third year being a team option.

The second veteran anchor was right fielder Juan Soto. I signed Soto to a six-year, $159 million contract in the off-season before the 2026 season. Soto was the only compensation eligible free agent I signed, but I deemed him to be worth it for two reasons. First, he was a very young free agent as he was entering his age 27 season. Second, he ranked as one of the top five players in the league by a modified version of my "MLB and MiLB Player Rankings" spreadsheet. If it wasn't for both of these conditions, I would not have given up a draft pick to sign him.

Soto was an average defender with a plus, high-contact bat. He proved to be a solid but not spectacular signing as he put up an average of 3 WAR in the three seasons leading in to 2029.

The emerging core consisted of an emerging star and an exciting, highly regarded supporting cast.

I'm not sure that I've ever seen a prospect rise through one of my farm systems quite like shortstop Juan Collado. Collado was the top ranked international amateur on my custom rankings and I signed him for the max $5 million in July 2025. He was the #10 ranked prospect in 2026, #5 in 2027, and #2 in 2028.

Despite having a current rating of 78 and potential of 80 (on the 20-80 scale), I started him in AAA for the first 20 days of the 2028 season. At only 19 years old, he made his debut as a gold glove caliber defender with a plus, power/contact bat. He didn't disappoint, either. Collado took home the Rookie of the Year award with 4.2 WAR as a teenager. Collado appeared to be a potential generational talent to build a dynasty around.

I also appeared to have a young, controlled supporting cast in place too.

Perhaps outfielder Najib bin Hamal deserves the label of sidekick more than supporting cast. bin Hamal was the eighth overall pick in the 2022 draft. He was the #66 ranked prospect in 2023, #54 in 2024, #40 in 2025, and #20 in 2026. He received a few MLB at bats as a September call-up in 2025. He entered 2026 at 22 years old as the starting center fielder.

His tool set included plus speed, above average defense, and a plus, balanced bat. In his first three seasons, bin Hamal averaged 4 WAR. In 2028, bin Hamal was named an all-star for the first time and received his first Silver Slugger award.

Outfielder Jim Anderson was the seventh overall pick in the 2023 draft. He was the #26 ranked prospect in 2024, #29 in 2025, #24 in 2026, and #20 in 2027. He received a few MLB at bats in 2026 and came into his own as a 25 year old rookie in 2027, finishing third in the Rookie of the Year voting. He averaged 2.5 WAR in his first two full seasons and received a Gold Glove award for his work in left field in 2028. He combined above average contact and power with a plus eye.

Jeff McIntyre was the third of my young outfielders. (Despite being an adequate fielder, I moved Soto to DH in 2028). McIntyre was drafted thirty-fourth overall, as a supplemental first round pick in the 2023 draft. He was the #71 ranked prospect in 2025, #41 in 2026, #29 in 2027, and #22 in 2028. He made a brief MLB debut in 2027 and only played a little more in 2028. His performance limited performance in 2028 was notable as he posted 1.1 WAR in only 225 plate appearances. He showed a strong contact tool with moderate, developing power and the ability to play above average to great defense at all three posts in the outfield.

At first base, I had Clemente Inclan, a trade acquisition at the end of the 2024 season. Prior to the start of the 2024 season, he was the #22 ranked prospect. I suspect he was available due to his advanced age (25) for being placed in AA. He projected to play gold glove caliber defense at first and to be a strong offensive contributor who could hit for average, power, draw walks, and avoid strikeouts at above average to great rates.

Inclan made his MLB debut in 2025 as a 26 year old. He won a Gold Glove award in 2027. Between 2025 and 2027, he averaged a little over 2 WAR per season. And then, in 2028, he broke out with a 5.6 WAR season, earning him an all-star selection, Silver Slugger award at 1B, and a third place finish in the MVP vote.

At third base, I had Garrett Blaylock, a Rule 5 acquisition before the start of the 2026 season. He profiled quite similarly to current Seattle third baseman Kyle Seager (plus defense, great eye, some contact ability, and some power). He finished third in the 2026 rookie of the Year vote as a late-blooming 28 year old. He averaged 3 WAR per season between 2026 and 2028.

Overall, this is about as good of a position player foundation as I could hope for: lots of current ability, upside, and control. Not to mention almost every player contributes both in multiple ways on offense, as well as on defense. There was also a good mix of ages, salaries, and control.

You might notice the only position not listed here is second base. Prior to the 2028 season, I signed middle infielder Nick Madrigal to moderate a three year, $22.5 million contract. He appeared to be a 2ish WAR player when I signed him, but he only managed to post a barely above replacement level 0.1 WAR in his first year with me. Already 31 years old and declining, he seemed a better fit for a bench or platoon role.

[GM_CheatSheets]

The Mariners' pitching appeared to be much more of a wild card. I had been getting by mostly by trading for veterans and taking on money in exchange for lesser players or prospects. It would be quite apt to say that my rotation was a collection of misfit pieces. In almost every case, my rotation was a bet on my outstanding defense just as much as the pitcher's talent.

I acquired SP George Kirby, a crafty lefty, at the trade deadline during the 2024 season. I got him at a bit of a discount by taking on the contract of an overpaid veteran and sending away a few mid-level prospects. Between 2024 and 2028 he averaged a little over 2 WAR per season. He entered 2029 at 30 years of age and with one remaining year of team control.

I traded for SP Luis Castillo before the start of the 2028 season. He came at a discount due to his salary (approximately $17 million per year for two years) and his age (35). Castillo peaked around 5 WAR earlier in his career (2022 Cy Young winner), but was optimistically a 2-3 WAR pitcher when I acquired him.

SP Michael Doolin was the 112th overall pick (4th round) in the 2022 draft. He pitched a handful of innings out of the bullpen in 2026 and made eleven starts as a 26 year old in 2027. At the end of 2028, he looked like a solid 2-3 WAR arm to rely on for years to come.

With the team's strong play in 2027 and 2028, I realized the need to fortify the future of the rotation. It didn't look like there was a lot of near term help coming from my farm system, so I made it a priority to add a few arms at the trade deadline in 2028. I had another highly regarded (#102 overall prospect) outfielder emerging, so I traded him and a few other pieces for two top of the rotation potential, 24 year old arms who were buried in the minors.

SP Jeff Gouge was the more highly regarded and advanced of the two. He was the #31 ranked prospect at the beginning of the 2028 season. Although he pitched a few innings in MLB in 2027, almost all of his innings before the trade in 2028 were registered at AA.

SP Riley Ferrell was the #78 ranked prospect prior to the 2028 season. Most of his innings prior to the trade were at A.

My scout was very high on both of them. They had high velocity fastballs, balanced pitchability, and deep enough repertoires to remain starters. I'm pretty sure the only reason I was able to trade for them is because they were, for whatever reason, stuck at the lower levels as older prospects.

Additionally, in anticipation of a need for innings, I traded for SP Henry Henry prior to the start of the 2029 season. He was a 30 year old veteran with two years of control remaining. He averaged 3 WAR in the two seasons prior to the trade. His moderate contract appeared to be a burden to a small market team and I was more than willing to take it on.

The bullpen was constructed mostly of fungible parts. The biggest arm in the pen belonged to CL Li-xue Zhen, a power pitcher signed prior to the start of the 2028 season as a 28 year old international free agent. In his first season in MLB, he posted 1.5 WAR and looked like a reliable closer or set up man. I had five more years of control, though he made $6 million for his pre-arb years rather than the minimum.

The rest of the arms in my system were either insignificant or disappointing at this point. And while I didn't expect this rotation to suddenly become dominant, there was a wide potential range of outcomes. Again, it was a bet made a little easier due to the quality of the team's defense.

[GM_CheatSheets]

As mentioned in the position player overview, second base was the only position without a set player. Conveniently, the top international free agent (and top overall free agent by my custom rankings) was a second baseman.

Kwang-rak Soung was 80 overall / 80 potential on the 20-80 scale with a plus bat and gold glove caliber defense. His offensive profile leaned a little more heavily toward contact, eye/discipline, and avoid k, but his power was still respectable. At 28 years of age, he was also entering his prime.

I went aggressively after Soung and eventually signed him to a six-year $171 million contract. This comes out to $28.5 million annually, which eclipses Juan Soto's contract. Luckily, I had the payroll space to fit both of them in, and Soto's contract would end in conjunction with other players reaching arbitration raises and free agency.

Although Soung would only be the top WAR finisher on my team once through the duration of his contract, I nonetheless see him as the linchpin of an improbable run (at least compared to my previous simulations).

Here is what followed:
2029: 114-48 (.704); lost Division Series
2030: 112-50 (.691); lost Division Series
2031: 116-46 (.716); lost Championship Series
2032: 123-39 (.759); lost World Series
2033: 105-57 (.648); lost Division Series
2034: 100-62 (.617); World Series champion!

Behind Soung and company, the Mariners went on an improbable run of six consecutive 100+ win seasons. They averaged 111.67 regular season wins per year in this span. They also broke the modern record for wins in a season by seven games (123 in 2032).

In terms of championships, it was disappointing to only win one World Series, but by every other measure, this was an unprecedented run of success.

Soung was a reliable presence every year and, in my opinion, was a key piece of the puzzle that made this team click.



Soung got of to a torrid start in MLB taking home the Most Valuable Player, Rookie of the Year, and Silver Slugger awards in 2029 behind his career-best 7.7 WAR. Over the next five years, he won another Silver Slugger award, a Gold Glove, and was a three time all-star selection. Overall, he posted 31.7 WAR over the six years of the contract.

[GM_CheatSheets]

In the first few years of the simulation, my coaching was average at best and ownership was frustrated with the team's poor performance. Coaching and ownership would play a key role in the success and extended window of the Soung era--they were two of the three components that set the Mariners' flywheel into effect. (Scouting, the third component, will be covered in the next post.)

There isn't a whole lot to analyze with coaching. It seemed to be a matter of once my team started to improve, my coaches improved with them, or better coaches were available to sign. When I signed my manager, Mike Shildt, he was regarded as "average". After the six-season run, he is now "legendary".

Shildt, favored sabermetrics and prospects. The bench coach managed more conventionally. I'm not sure how much this stuff matters, but it seemed to work okay for me. Shildt won the Manager of the Year award in 2029, 2031, 2032, and 2033. The awards have not yet been announced for 2034. He could very well win again as the Mariners had the most wins in the AL and won the World Series.

I think both my hitting and pitching coaches were regarded as "great" when I signed them. They both are now "legendary". The hitting coach works well with all types of hitters and the pitching coach works best with power arms.

Overall, the coaching seemed to have a high impact on the team as almost all of my players seemed to play up to or max out their talents. If I'm being critical, I do wonder how much of an impact this had. Perhaps in a future sim I will turn off the coaching feature.

Though I don't consider him a part of the coaching staff, the team trainer does deserve mention. He has been consistently regarded as "great" and is pretty balanced in his ability to treat and prevent various injuries and ailments.

The only season I felt that I was lucky in regard to avoiding injuries was 2029, the first of this run. Otherwise, every season had various injuries to key players. Considering several of my players were "fragile" when it came to injury history, maybe I was more lucky than it felt. I do admit that I was lucky to avoid Tommy John type injuries to my best rotation arms.

Overall, there was some luck with avoiding injuries, but regardless of who got hurt, I always seemed to have a prospect, bench player, or bullpen arm ready to step into a bigger role. In my opinion, depth is a better strategy to defeat injuries than the best trainer.

When it came to my owner, he probably wanted to fire me in the first few years I was in charge. Now we have a better relationship. I don't like playing with owner goals because the goals seem quite arbitrary to me--or even contrary to building a good team.

Seattle has been rated as an "above average" market size with "average" fan interest for the entirety of the sim. At the lowest point (2023), my team payroll was $68.8 million. As an "economizer" he didn't seem to have any issue with increasing the team payroll as long as the team maintained its success.

Through the six-year run covered in the previous post, my team payroll was $131.6 million (2029), $132 million (2030), $134.6 million (2031), $162.3 million (2032), $174.4 million (2033), and $190.9 million (2034). The increased payroll played a major role in the continued run of success. Most notably, I was able to sign some of my star players to extensions. Also worth noting, I was able to sign a few free agents to short term contracts for specific roles, which help mask a few holes in my player development pipeline.

I believe the biggest secret to convincing my owner to increase the amount of money I had available for free agents and extensions was to implement dynamic pricing. Starting in 2031, I advanced only one day at a time and adjusted the ticket price before every home game.

Others have studied this more than me and provided more detailed write ups of how to implement this. For me, there were a few key aspects. First, I set the season ticket prices very high in the offseason/preseason. This might result in fewer season tickets sold, but can help to maximize revenue per game if you stick to the strategy.

Second, I varied the ticket price by day of week, fan interest level, and whether the team is hot or cold. The goal here is to sellout or nearly sellout every single game. To do this, ticket prices should be the lowest on Mondays and Tuesdays, can increase slightly for Wednesdays and Thursdays, jump higher for Fridays, and increase a little more for each Saturdays and Sundays.

For me, it takes a few weeks of games to feel out where the "sellout point" or optimal ticket price is for each game. Season-to-season, the number of season tickets you sell impacts how many available seats there are left to fill on a game-by-game basis. If you sell fewer season tickets than the prior year (hopefully at a higher price), your game day prices might need to be a little lower to fill up the stadium. Other factors I consider in determining game day prices include fluctuations in fan interest level and whether the team is on a hot or cold streak.

Third, I increase the ticket price significantly for the last game of the season, which will hold for the entirety of the playoffs. Playoff revenue is always a good boost for the teams finances. It's even better when you price playoff tickets near the optimal price for just barely selling out.

Overall, the dynamic ticket pricing strategy took a lot of attention, but helped push what I thought was a definite payroll ceiling even higher. I might not take the time to do this every season, but it could very well be worth it if I want to keep a core together as they get more expensive or feel that I am one free agent away from success.

Next up, I'll cover how I handed scouting and player development.

[GM_CheatSheets]

Scouting and development also played an important role in building a dynasty poised for long-term success. In my opinion, my scout is usually the most important individual in my organization as a lot of my successes or failures will ultimately trace back to him. There are few things I dread more than a reliable scout retiring or refusing to re-sign with my organization (usually to take on a GM role in another organization).

I prefer my scout to "heavily favor tools" and to be a talented evaluator of, in order, amateurs, international amateurs, major leaguers, and minor leaguers.

For this franchise, I've kept my scouting budget and scouting budget distribution the same every year. I've spent $20 million on scouting ($8 million league baseline and $24 million max). I've distributed the budget with 29% MLB, 18% MiLB, 33% amateurs, and 20% international.

I didn't keep detailed records of my scouts, but Dominique Rodgers accounted for the longest stretch from 2024 to 2031. When I hired him, he had no coaching experience but good potential. In 2032, he refused to entertain another extension. Regrettably, I forgot to promote him immediately after the playoffs ended to Assistant GM. As a result, he decided to leave my organization entirely to become the GM of the Baltimore Orioles. His most notable ratings are an "outstanding" ability to scout international talent, as well as major leaguers.

My current scout, Lonnie Goldberg, previously served as the scouting director for Kansas City. He is rated "excellent" at scouting amateur talent, as well as major leaguers.

In previous simulations, I've maxed out my development budget. For this franchise, I've decided to keep my player development budget in line with the league average of $12 million.

To maximize the quality of talent entering my player development pipeline, I followed the five part strategy listed below.

1. Maximize compensation picks. Especially when I'm in a rebuilding mode, and even when I'm contending, I try to keep track of which of my players are compensation eligible in 1-2 years. Occasionally, I am able to turn short term contracts for closers into a comp pick. I have also had some success trading for players with a year and a half left on their contract. I very rarely sign players to extensions and prefer to give the next player in my prospect pipeline a shot and get a compensation pick in return.

2. Set amateur draft signing budget to $8 million. Setting a large signing budget allows me to go after players who fall due to high demands. In cases of "impossible" demand players, I've found that generally offering them a little more than twice the demand that appears in the negotiate contract screen. I tend to favor a best player available type of approach roughly using the ratings from my custom spreadsheets. I noticed that I've developed a tendency to target younger players in the draft. I'm not sure if this is because of my scout "highly favoring tools" or due to my personal selection.

3. Sign the top international amateur free agent every year. This is a new trick with the spending limits on international amateurs. I've found that I'm able to sign any player who I offer $5 million. I use my spreadsheet to determine the top few prospects in the international amateur class every year and make my top target a $5 million offer.

4. International scouting discoveries are a bit out of my control, but can be an essential talent source. The only two ways I know to influence this are to spend more money on international scouting and to have a scout that is skilled at international talent evaluation.

5. Trade from your depth to fill organizational holes. One of the byproducts of taking a best player available approach is that you might build considerable depth at a few positions while others are more scarce. By using my spreadsheet, my system is usually stacked with players that other teams are interested in in just a few short years. Identifying potential targets is a little difficult. One way I do this is to shop around some of my talented young players to see who other teams might make available. From there, I pull the player I shopped out of the trade and add in a quality prospect from one of my depth areas and use the "make trade work now" button to see how close we are to a deal. I try to stay to 1-for-1, 2-for-1, 2-for-2, and 3-for-2 deals. Otherwise it is easy to unrealistically trade a bunch of quantity for quality.

I've found that the AI tends to undervalue players who are in their mid 20's and still in the low minors. I've traded for several players of this profile who my scout was high. Several of them have gone on to perform well after immediate promotions to the high minors. A few have also succeeded in the majors.

While I think that this strategy should work well overall, it is important to be aware of your scout's talents and tendencies. If you are working with limited money or want to limit the amount of time you invest in game play, I would focus on one or two of the strategies outlined above. For example, if your scout is really talented at evaluating international players, you can direct a large portion of your scouting budget to international players and focus on numbers three and four above.

If you are willing to take the time to do all of these, another way to approach it is to invest more money into the areas that your scout is weaker at. Theoretically, this could help to balance out the strengths and weaknesses. Anecdotally, I feel that a scout who is talented at amateur scouting will still scout amateur talent well on a limited budget. Or, at least, you can still have a quality amateur scouting operation without investing quite as much money into it.